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JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES – MEDICAL CARE, MINORS 






Responsible and caring parents seek the best possible medical care for 
their children. In the case of parents who are Jehovah’s Witnesses their 
religious beliefs prohibit medical intervention which uses blood. This 
prohibition specifically includes the refusal of blood transfusions even where 
such a refusal may result in the death of the person concerned. Jehovah’s 
Witnesses as a result are often viewed with animosity or contempt, considered 
foolhardy and recklessly disregarding life, martyring themselves and their 
children. This article seeks to examine the religious origins of the blood 
prohibition and attempts to set the rationale for refusal in its religious context. 
It also explores the approach of the courts in the UK, the US and Canada to 
Jehovah’s Witnesses children (supported by their parents) including those 
who have expressed a wish to refuse such treatment or else have been too 
young to do so. It concludes with presenting such refusal as a religious right 
which it is argued engages article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). 
 
THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE ON BLOOD  
 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ belief system is derived from the Bible. This is the 
means by which Jehovah1 transmitted his standard to mankind and established 
the principles governing the way one should worship and live one’s life.2 
Biblical principles are applied to all aspects of life, ranging from parenting3 to 
∗ This article is based on an undergraduate dissertation submitted to the Faculty of 
Law, University of Reading LLB programme 2005.  David Ziebart LLB gave 
permission to the Denning Law Journal’s Editor to adapt the dissertation for 
publication. David Ziebart is a consultant at Michael Page International and a 
practising Jehovah’s Witness.  
1 The personal name of God in the Bible, translated from Hebrew, meaning ‘He 
Causes to Become.’ 
2  ‘All Scripture Is Inspired of God and Beneficial,’ (Watchtower Bible and Tract 
Society, Inc 1990) p 7. 
3 Eg‘How to be a Successful Parent,’ Watchtower 1st  May 1988, (Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society, Inc 1988) p 3-6. 
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moral behaviour4 and to political neutrality. Throughout the Bible, life is 
viewed as a gift from Jehovah and many Christians today recognise Jehovah 
as the ultimate Source of life.5 In the Bible, blood is often used as a symbol of 
the soul or life of a human or animal, and this is seen as belonging to God. 
The first Biblical injunction prohibiting the eating of blood was given to Noah 
and his sons: “Every moving animal that is alive may serve as food for you.  
As in the case of green vegetation, I do give it all to you. Only flesh with its 
soul - its blood - you must not eat.”6  
This was repeated much later in Mosaic Law, where, to prevent the 
consumption of blood, it was not to be stored but instead “poured out” on the 
ground like water and covered with dust effectively giving it back to Jehovah, 
not using it for one’s own purpose.7 Mosaic Law called for a number of 
offerings to be made to God, such as grain, oil and wine.8 It permitted the 
Israelites to use blood ONLY in the offering of animal sacrifices to Jehovah 
so that they could be granted forgiveness for their inherited sinful state. The 
redemptive power of blood is found in Leviticus 17: 11,12 (emphasis added): 
 
“The soul of the flesh is in the blood, and I myself have put it 
upon the altar for you to make atonement for your souls, 
because it is the blood that makes atonement by the soul in it. 
That is why I have said to the sons of Israel: “No soul of you 
must eat blood.” 
  
Christians also understood blood as having a unique role associated with 
providing relief from sin and death inherited from Adam. The Apostle Paul 
writing in the 1st Century CE, in Hebrews 9:22 commented, “nearly all things 
are cleansed with blood according to the Law, and unless blood is poured out 
no forgiveness takes place.” Under Mosaic Law, animal’s blood was poured 
at the base of the altar to illustrate that atonement depended on blood.9 
However in Hebrews 10:3,4 it is written, “By these sacrifices there is a 
reminding of sins from year to year, for it is not possible for the blood of bulls 
and goats to take sins away.” Hence the animal sacrifices only prefigured the 
sacrificial death of Jesus Christ, who would give his life or pour out his blood 
to redeem mankind. Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that the Bible is categorical 
4 Eg ‘Learn and Teach Christian Morality,’ Watchtower 15th June 2002, (Watchtower 
Bible and Tract Society, Inc 2002) p 17-22. 
5 Acts 17:28 ; Revelation 4:11. 
6 Genesis 9:3,4; Ibid. 
7 Deuteronomy 12:16. 
8 Leviticus 2:1-4; 23:13; Numbers 15:1-5. 
9 Leviticus 9:9; Hebrews 9:22; 1 Corinthians 1:18; See also Insight on the Scriptures 
Volume 2 (Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, Inc 1988) p 345. 
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about forgiveness resting on the presence of Christ’s blood. “This means my 
blood of the covenant, which is to be poured out on behalf of many for 
forgiveness of sins.”10 Similarly, Paul’s letter to the congregation in Ephesus 
provides further evidence on this point: 
 
“By means of him we have the release by ransom through the 
blood of that one, yes, the forgiveness of our trespasses, 
according to the riches of his undeserved kindness.”11
 
The only way for Christians to be forgiven for their sins and gain benefits 
from the ransom is “through the blood he (Jesus) shed.”12 Revelation speaks 
of those who “wash their robes in the blood of the Lamb (Jesus),”13 thought to 
symbolize followers of Jesus cleansing their consciences before God.   
Hence mankind was not allowed to use blood in any unauthorised way. It 
had legal significance before Jehovah as it enabled permanent forgiveness and 
eternal salvation. Such sanctity was to be respected. 
Whether the restrictions in the Mosaic Law were to be binding on 1st 
century Christians was debated by a Council in Jerusalem in 49 C.E. After 
careful consideration, James, the Chairman of the Council, stated that 
Christians were only bound to observe certain divine requirements, as 
outlined in Acts 15:28,29: 
 
“The holy spirit and we ourselves have favoured adding no 
burden to you, except these necessary things, to keep 
abstaining from things sacrificed to idols and from blood and 
from things strangled and from fornication.  If you carefully 
keep yourselves from these things you will prosper.”   
 
Although not all the specific provisions within the Mosaic Law were to be 
binding on Christians after the death of Christ, the need to “abstain from 
blood” and recognise its elevated position was clearly ratified within this text.  
The early Christian congregations took the ruling of the Jerusalem Council as 
definitive, with the “decision that they should keep themselves from what is 
sacrificed to idols as well as from blood and what is strangled and from 
fornication.” 14  
10 Matthew 26:28. 
11 Ephesians 1:7. 
12 Colossians 1:20. 
13 Revelation 7:9,14. 
14 Acts 21:25. See also The historical record of theologian Priestley J The Theological 
and Miscellaneous Works, (Volume IX, 1818) p 366also recognizes the importance of 
the Biblical injunction on the Christians in the 1st Century CE:‘The prohibition to eat 
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BLOOD PROHIBITION IN MEDICAL TREATMENT 
 
The medical use of blood is also incorporated within the scope of this 
prohibition. The scriptural passages in Acts refer separately to “blood” and 
“what is strangled” in order to clarify that blood is to be avoided both as part 
of one’s diet, as in the case of un-bled meat, and also as “blood” itself.15 This 
latter context includes the use of blood for therapeutic purposes, a popular 
therapy for certain ailments at the time.  The second-century physician 
Aretaeus of Cappadocia, reported on the drinking of human blood as a 
treatment for epilepsy.16 By the 16th century experiments involving transfused 
blood began. Thomas Bartholin, the professor of anatomy at the University of 
Copenhagen, noted with concern the dilemma medical treatment posed for 
religious observance. 
 
“Those who drag in the use of human blood for internal 
remedies of diseases appear to misuse it and to sin gravely. 
Cannibals are condemned. Why do we not abhor those who 
stain their gullet with human blood? Similar is the receiving 
of human blood from a cut vein, either through the mouth or 
by instruments of transfusion. The authors of this operation 
are held in terror by the divine law, by which the eating of 
blood is prohibited.”17
 
 Jehovah’s Witnesses will not accept transfusions of whole blood, or any 
of the primary components namely red and white blood cells, plasma and 
platelets. There is no biblical command that forbids the use of other human 
tissue or bone. None of the scriptures state that such body parts have special 
significance in God’s eyes. It is therefore left to the conscience of an 
 
blood, given to Noah, seems to be obligatory on all his posterity...If we interpret [the] 
prohibition of the apostles by the practice of the primitive Christians, who can hardly 
be supposed not to have rightly understood the nature and extent of it, we cannot but 
conclude, that it was intended to be absolute and perpetual; for blood was not eaten by 
any Christians for many centuries.’ See also Benson J, The Holy Bible, Containing the 
Old and New Testaments, (New York, Volume I, 1839) p 43, see also Newton I, The 
Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms Amended, (Dublin, 1728) p 184. 
15 Stevenson P A Manual for Blood Conservation, (tfm Publishing Ltd, 2005) p 191.  
16 Adams F The Extant Works of Arateaus, the Cappodocian,’ (The Sydenham 
Society, London, 1855) p 471.See also Tertullian (c 160-230 CE), Apology (Loeb 
Classical Library, Cambridge and London, 1977) Chapter 30, p 409; Pliny, Natural 
History, By Pliny XXVIII.ii.4, (Loeb Classical Library, Vol VIII, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA) p 5. 
17 Bartholin T ‘A Medical Disquisition Concerning the Prohibition of Blood,’ 
(Frankfurt, 1673) p 11. 
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individual as to whether they view organ transplants as an acceptable form of 
treatment. With regard to the use of secondary blood components such as 
albumin and haemophiliac preparation, it is again for the individual concerned 
to decide whether they fell these fall within the scope of the scriptural 
prohibitions.18
 
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES - MEDICAL TREATMENT AND 
SELF DETERMINATION 
 
How does the law regard Jehovah’s Witnesses who wish to be treated without 
the use of blood products? The starting point requires consideration of how far 
the principle of self-determination is granted legal recognition in relation to 
medical care, and how that principle is affected by the age of a patient.  
 
Self-Determination – An Established Legal Principle 
 
The concept of self-determination was summarized by Lord Donaldson as 
“the patient’s interest…to live his own life how he wishes, even if it will 
damage his health or lead to a premature death.”19 The general legal rule that 
is a well established cornerstone of medical law within the UK is that in order 
for a doctor to proceed, the consent of the patient is required: 
 
“...every human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what should be done with his own body; 
and the surgeon who performs an operation without consent 
commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.”20  
 
Justice Cardoza’s legal rule is clear and unambiguous, and has received 
recognition not only in common law and legislation but also within numerous 
ethical codes21 and international agreements.22 The penalties imposed on 
18 Family Care and Medical Management of Jehovah’s Witnesses, (Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society, Inc 2000) Beliefs p 4. 
19 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) (1992) 9 BMLR 46 at 59. 
20Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914) 211 NY 125 at 126 per Cardoza 
J Approved, for example, in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 All ER 545; 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821; Hughes J in Re AK (Medical 
Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129; Butler-Sloss P in Ms B and an NHS Hospital 
Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). 
21 Eg  Information and Consent for Anaesthesia, The Association of Anaesthetists of 
Great Britain and Ireland, July 1999; Seeking Patients’ Consent: The Ethical 
Considerations, General Medical Council, August 1999.  
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physicians who disregard such a principle can be criminal as well as civil. In 
1992, the House of Lords said:  
 
“Any treatment given by a doctor to a patient which is 
invasive (ie involves any interference with the physical 
integrity of the patient) is unlawful unless done with the 
consent of the patient: it constitutes the crime of battery and 
the tort of trespass to the person.”23  
  
The potential charge of battery is designed to act as a deterrent to make 
doctors think twice about treating patients in a way that they personally view 
as correct but that has little regard for the autonomy of the patient. Although 
unlikely to be liable for the crime of battery if they have acted in good faith, 
the fact that there can be civil repercussions for physicians either in the tort of 
battery or negligence illustrates that the judiciary will not simply ignore a 
patient’s autonomy by deferring to the doctor’s assessment of what is 
medically appropriate.  If the situation is an emergency and the patient is 
unable to communicate their medical wishes, the common law grants a doctor 
the right to proceed without patient consent under the doctrine of necessity.24 
Such permission would apply to unconscious/comatose adults in an 
emergency situation where their personal wishes cannot be ascertained.25 
However, when the wishes of the patient are clear, the right of self-
determination is unaffected if a patient decides to reject a form of medical 
intervention that is regarded as the only chance for the life of the patient. The 
actions of a doctor who proceeds without patient approval will be unlawful.  
The extent to which the UK courts will protect an adult’s right to choose 
or refuse is evident by the force of the language in the judgements in Airedale 
NHS Trust v Bland: 
 
“A (competent) person is completely at liberty to decline to 
undergo treatment, even if the result of his doing so will be 
 
22 Eg The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; The European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950. 
23Airedale NHS Trust v Bland  [1993] 1 All ER 821 at 882 per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. 
24 Re F (A Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, per Lord Goff at 73. 
25 Under such circumstance the Advanced Medical Directive. Provides a means of 
anticipating  a patients wishes see. HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017; 
Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129. 
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that he will die.”26….”The principle of sanctity of human 
life must yield to the principle of self-determination.”27
 
Doctors can face civil liability in negligence or criminal culpability in 
manslaughter28 or even murder29 where inappropriate treatment, or no 
treatment at all, is administered. However, even in this critical context, the 
individual’s right to self-determination where competent should be the 
prevailing interest. 
When applying these legal principles to the medical care of an adult 
Jehovah’s Witness, the case law establishes that the principle of self-
determination allows a competent individual to refuse a blood transfusion on 
religious grounds. The key issue is whether the patient has the necessary 
capacity, or competence to decide, whether to consent to or refuse a particular 
form of treatment.30 Re T31 established that an adult will be presumed to have 
such decision-making capacity, but such a presumption can be rebutted, at 
which point such an individual is classed as incompetent.32 Capacity within 
the UK legal system is not determined on the basis of what society in general 
views as a reasonable or rational decision, but instead on the three-stage test 
of competence identified by Thorpe J in Re C. 33 The adult patient must be 
able to: 
1. comprehend and retain the necessary information 
2. believe it; and 
3. weigh the information, balancing the risks and needs, so as to come to 
a choice. 
Lord Donaldson MR made it abundantly clear in Re T that an adult who 
refused a potentially lifesaving blood transfusion on religious grounds would 
not be regarded as incompetent simply because the majority of society would 
view such a stance as wholly irrational.  The adult patient still had the right to 
decide: “[a patient’s ] right of choice is not limited to decisions which others 
might regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making 
a choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.”34  The Court 
26Airedale Trust at 860 per Lord Keith. 
27Airedale Trust at 866 per Lord Goff of Chieveley. 
28 R v Adamako [1995] 1 AC 171. 
29 R v Adams (Bodkin) [1957] Crim LR 365; R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38. 
30 This discussion will use the terms ‘capacity, and ‘competence’ interchangeably. 
31Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment)  [1992] 4 All ER 649.  
32Ibid, per Lord Donaldson at 796D. 
33Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 FLR 31 at 33D. Reaffirmed, 
for example, in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S  [1998] 3 All ER 673. 
34 Concurring with Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871, per Lord 
Templeman at 904. 
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of Appeal in Re MB35 endorsed the Re C test and recognised that in principle 
a patient’s veto of medical treatment on religious grounds could be valid even 
if the consequences could be death for, in this instance, the pregnant mother 
or her unborn child. The present state of the law did not support the 
conclusion that an unborn child should be granted any legal interests, as had 
been suggested in previous cases.36 The court in Re MB also concurred with 
the earlier remarks of Lord Donaldson MR in Re T, that the competence of a 
patient must be “commensurate with the gravity of the decision…The more 
serious the decision, the greater the capacity required.”37 Such a statement is 
not thought to promote the view that a greater level of reasoning ability is 
required for a decision with more serious consequences, but rather, that the 
patient should be able to understand more detail about the procedure involved 
before making such a decision. As such, judicial scrutiny of a patient’s 
decision-making capacity and reasoning will be at its highest in a life-
threatening situation.38 However, once capacity is established on the basis of 
Re C, the State has no power to interfere or obstruct competent adult refusal.   
The recent approach of the judiciary has been to defer to the wishes of 
competent adults, even when the personal view of the judge in question may 
well have been that refusal of treatment based on religious beliefs was an 
irrational stance.39 Although there may be an understandable reluctance on the 
part of a doctor to discontinue treatment when they perceive that they can 
intervene to remedy a medical condition, it was recently emphasised that such 
a desire to preserve life should not take precedence over an adult’s competent 
request for cessation of treatment.40
 
Competent Minors and medical treatment 
 
The UK law has demonstrated an unwillingness to apply these clearly 
embedded legal principles to minors in the regulation of their own healthcare 
even where they are ostensibly competent. Historically, the common law was 
unclear as to whether a minor could make medical decisions for themselves, 
leaving some to suggest that a child could never validly consent to 
35Re MB (Adult: Medical Treatment)  (1997) 38 BMLR 175 at pp 48  per Butler-Sloss 
LJ. 
36 Eg Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671; Thorpe J 
obiter in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] 1 All ER 677. 
37 Re T per Lord Donaldson at 796F. 
38 Kennedy I and Grubb A, Medical Law, (Butterworths 3rd Edition 2000) p 627. 
39See Re T approving the Canadian case of Malette v Shulman (1990) 72 OR (2d) 
(Ontario CA). 
40 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All E.R. 449. 
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treatment.41 However, the right of competent minors to consent under certain 
conditions is codified within government legislation. For example, a 16 or 17-
year-old can consent to medical treatment under the provisions within Section 
8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969. Nolan LJ, commenting on the effect of 
this statute in Re W,42 made it clear that 16 and 17-year-olds have “the same 
capacity as an adult to surgical, medical or dental treatment.”43 This is 
rebuttable, however, if the child suffers from a mental disability which will 
affect their understanding. In general though, the minor who is 16 or older is 
placed in the same legal position as an adult in this context.  
Lord Scarman in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority44 established that a minor who is under 16 and who demonstrates a 
“sufficient understanding and intelligence,” can have the legal right to make 
their own medical decisions.45 The court would have to be satisfied that the 
minor understood the nature, purpose and likely consequences of undergoing 
or not undergoing the procedure, although such issues would be a question of 
fact, and would often depend on the maturity and developmental capacity of 
the young person.46 Once a minor has demonstrated the necessary level of 
capacity required of them, any consent to medical treatment will be legally 
effective despite any parental objections to such medical intervention. In the 
context of minors whose parents are Jehovah’s Witnesses but who themselves 
do not believe or adhere to such religious views, the law allows “Gillick” 
competent minors to consent to a blood transfusion even if their parents do 
not consider such treatment to be correct or proper. The doctor would be able 
to proceed without the risk of litigation from any disapproving parents or 
relatives. 47
When a minor wishes to refuse medical treatment, all minors including 16 
and 17-year-olds must fulfil the test of legal competence expected of children 
under 16; namely, they must have or achieve “Gillick” competence. However, 
many of the cases dealing with the issue of “Gillick” competence within this 
category have required a very high level of understanding and appreciation of 
the consequences of the decision made when life is at risk.  
 
 
41 Eg See the discussion by Staughton LJ in Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to 
Treatment) [1991] 3 WLR 592 at 604. 
42 Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758. 
43 Ibid at 776.  
44 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
45 Ibid at 423. 
46 Ibid at 411 per Lord Fraser.  
47 Ibid at 423.  
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JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES MINORS – SELF DETERMINATION 
 
This has been particularly evident when the courts have had to confront 
cases involving young people who are conscientious Jehovah’s Witnesses. In 
Re E,48 which concerned a boy of 15 ¾ who suffered from leukaemia, the 
medical treatment advised by the hospital authority involved administering 
blood products offering a predicted full remission rate of 80-90 per cent. E, a 
Jehovah’s Witness, refused such treatment. In these circumstances, Ward J 
addressed what he felt to be the necessary level of understanding in order for 
“Gillick” competence to be established. He was impressed by the obvious 
intelligence of E and recognised that E was of sufficient intelligence to make 
decisions about his own well-being, nonetheless, the judge still found that he 
could not be classed as a “Gillick” competent minor and as such his veto of 
treatment could not be legally binding.49 Ward J considered E possessed: 
 
“no realisation [by E] of the full implications which lie 
before him as to the process of dying. He may have some 
concept of the fact that he will die, but as to the manner of 
his death and to the extent of his and his family’s suffering I 
find he has not the ability to turn his mind to it nor the will to 
do so.”50
 
Ward J suggested that in later years, E could be likely to “suffer some 
diminution in his convictions.”51 Ward J was to be proved wrong. E 
maintained his religious convictions throughout his life and on reaching the 
age of majority,  refused all blood-based treatment and subsequently died.52
In Re S, 53 the minor in question was 15½-years-old and had a potentially 
life-threatening form of thalassaemia that had been treated from birth using 
blood products, something that the minor wished to stop. Johnson J was full 
of praise for S, but he concluded that: 
 
“...whilst as she gave evidence I was so very strongly 
impressed by her integrity and her commitment, I believe 
they were the integrity and commitment of a child and not of 
48 Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386. 
49 Ibid at 224. 
50 Ibid at 224. 
51 Ibid at 226. 
52 Revealed by Johnson J in Re S (A Minor) (Consent to Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 
FLR 1065 at 1075. 
53 Ibid. 
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somebody who was competent to make a decision that she 
tells me she has made.”54
 
The minor was held to not be “Gillick” competent on the basis of her 
emotional immaturity and the fact that she was “very much ...a child.” 
Johnson J placed reliance on Ward J’s judgement in Re E, concurring with his 
views that a sufficient level of understanding about death is necessary, 
concluding that: 
 
“an understanding that she will die is not enough. For her 
decision to carry weight she should have a greater 
understanding of the manner of the death and pain and the 
distress.”55
 
In Re L56 a 14-year-old refused a blood transfusion. Bloodless surgery was 
not viewed as possible and the minor was likely to undergo a “horrible” death 
without the necessary surgery being performed. The refusal of such medical 
treatment manifested itself both in the anticipatory form of an ‘Advanced 
Medical Directive’ prohibiting the use of blood for medical treatment in all 
circumstances, signed by the minor, as well as a clear refusal of consent given 
to the surgeon by the minor after the accident. Throughout the judgement, Sir 
Stephen Brown, P, acknowledged that such religious beliefs were strongly and 
sincerely held and also accepted that L was “mature for her age.” However, L 
was held not to have the necessary competence under the “Gillick” test. The 
basis for such a conclusion was the fact that L’s view “did not in fact lend 
itself in her mind to a discussion.”57 Sir Stephen Brown commented that she 
had not been told or made aware of all the grave consequences relating to the 
manner of her death that would occur.  As such, her lack of understanding of 
the way that she would die effectively vitiated her ability to be competently 
able to give such a refusal.58
The reasoning used by the judges in these cases to rebut a finding of 
“Gillick” competence has been criticized. In Re E, Ward J concluded that the 
minor was unable to give sufficient thought to the concept and process of 
dying, although such an exceptionally comprehensive understanding of the 
dying process and death is unlikely to be found in a sick patient who has 
achieved majority status.  Similarly, the level of understanding in both Re S 
and Re L would not be legally required by an adult looking to exercise their 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid at 1073.  
56 Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810. 
57 Ibid at 812A. 
58 Ibid at 812G. 
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autonomy in this situation. Such an individual would merely have to satisfy 
the three-stage test in Re C, something it can be strongly argued that all three 
conscientious minors would have done. An understanding of the nature of the 
pain that may follow refusal, or the manner of death, or the reaction of family 
members would not be required. This is highly significant in the context of 
minors that are Jehovah’s Witnesses as the practical effect of such a stance is 
that it will be almost impossible to hold that such minors are “Gillick” 
competent. One commentator noted that “case law establishes far less 
stringent requirements when assessing an adult patient’s competence to refuse 
treatment [than a child]. These requirements are difficult to justify on logical 
grounds to the teenagers themselves.”59
In Re S, Johnson J also used in his reasoning the fact that S was hopeful of 
some kind of miracle as a reason to conclude that she lacked the necessary 
level of legal competence. It was suggested that the hope that S had that she 
might not actually die limited her understanding of the severity of the 
situation. However, there was never any suggestion that S had a mental 
condition causing a misperception of reality, which, if that had been the case, 
would have rebutted any adult’s presumption of competence. Her reasoning 
was not distorted; she simply hoped for a miracle that would relieve her of 
death. Kennedy and Grubb notes that many terminally ill patients hope for a 
miracle cure even when their doctors make clear that they are going to die.60 
The fact that the patient perceives their chances of survival differently from 
the doctor should not be used against a patient to conclude that they are 
incompetent. Surely the preferable view is that such a hope is the product of 
an individual’s belief system, in S’s case motivated by the strong religious 
background with which she was associated. 
In Re L, Sir Stephen Brown seemed to hold against the minor the fact that 
she did not consider her religious views to be negotiable. Instead of viewing 
this as a positive indication of L’s strength of feeling on the matter, he 
attributed this view to the fact that she was a child with a largely sheltered 
upbringing which limited her understanding. Her lack of experience of life 
was said to make the minor unable to formulate a competent opinion. 
However, the judge acknowledged how deeply held and sincere L’s religious 
convictions were, and the minor’s anticipatory refusal was clear evidence 
reflecting her most recent views that she did not want blood in relation to 
medical care in any circumstances. Is it likely then that if L had been an 18-
year-old her additional life experience would have resulted in anything but the 
same conscientious refusal?    
59 Fortin J Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (1998), pp 108-109. 
60 Kennedy I and Grubb A Medical Law, (Butterworths 3rd Edition 2000) p 650. 
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Even if this latter point cannot be definitively concluded either way, Sir 
Stephen Brown’s reasoning, that L could not be sufficiently competent on the 
basis that she had not been made aware of the actual manner of her death, 
does not adequately protect the patient’s interests. The minor was unaware of 
such information because the doctor felt that such disclosure was 
inappropriate. Although the intentions of the doctor may have been 
honourable in this regard, such a fact should hardly be used against the minor 
to deprive her of the opportunity of establishing legal competency. It is the 
responsibility of the practicing physician to provide the patient with all the 
vital information that will impact on the decision-making process.61 The 
consent or refusal of the patient will then be suitably informed. The patient’s 
lack of information could have been remedied before the case came to Court. 
The cynical though persuasive view of some commentators is that doctors 
might deliberately vitiate refusal of consent by withholding information.62 
How can negligence on the part of the doctor in withholding vital information 
from L be used by the judiciary as justification for disregarding the minor’s 
autonomy?   
The decisions of Jehovah’s Witness teenagers have wrongly been classed 
as incompetent to provide justification for disregarding beliefs that are sincere 
and heartfelt, and wholly defensible. To manipulate the legal concept of 
competence so that more is expected of minors than adults in such a serious 
context is totally inappropriate, notes Kennedy and Grubb.63 Other critics go 
as far as suggesting that such an approach amounts to positive discrimination, 
and cannot be reconciled with Article 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998, due 
to the way that it endorses age based discrimination.64
 
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES MINORS – THEIR “BEST 
INTERESTS”  
 
Whilst all these judgements have concluded that the youths have been 
incompetent when assessing their decision-making capacity, the case law can 
be seen to endorse the view that the issue of competence is not the most 
important consideration to the judiciary. Ward J  in Re E  stated that whether 
the minor was “Gillick” competent or not was not in his opinion the key issue. 
“Whether or not he is of sufficient understanding to have given consent or to 
61 The need for proper consultation with the patient was emphasized in St. George’s 
Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Louise Collins et al, ex parte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
62 Mason G K & McCall Smith A, Law and Medical Ethics, (Butterworths 4th Edition 
1994); supra note 19 p 616. 
63 Kennedy I and Grubb A, Medical Law, (Butterworths 3rd Edition 2000) p 650.   
64 Wicks E The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment under the European Convention 
on Human Rights, Medical Law Review, (2001; 9) p 17-40. 
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withhold consent is not the issue for me.”65 The primary concern in Ward J’s 
eyes, endorsing the observations of Lord Hailsham in Re B,66 was the welfare 
of the child from an objective viewpoint. The Court would do all it could to 
stop the child from damaging himself. Ward J had strong views about what 
the obligations of the Court were in this regard: “There is compelling and 
overwhelming force in the submission of the Official Solicitor that this court, 
exercising its prerogative of protection, should be very slow to allow a child 
to martyr himself.”67 The jurisdiction of the High Court was comprehensively 
discussed in two Court of Appeal cases considering the right of a minor to 
veto recommended medical treatment.68 Instead of focusing on the concept of 
self-determination, these cases instead viewed the “child’s own best interests, 
objectively considered”69 as the key consideration.  This approach was 
exemplified by Nolan LJ’s comments that:  “An individual who has attained 
the age of 18 is free to do with his life what he wishes, but it is the duty of the 
court to ensure so far as it can that children survive to attain that age.”70
Such a viewpoint was echoed in Re R, where Lord Donaldson quoted the 
words of Lord Upjohn that the duty of the court was to “act as the judicial 
reasonable parent.”71 However, he then clarified that the Court’s powers 
extend beyond those of a parent, or a competent minor, when evaluating when 
to give consent to medical treatment. The Court had a duty to exercise its 
powers in the interests of the children, reflecting the reasonable standards in 
society at the time about how children should be brought up.  In Re R such 
reasoning was used to justify the Court exercising its jurisdiction to override 
the wishes of a minor who had refused anti-psychotic medication. It was 
reinforced that even if a decision regarding medical treatment was made by a 
“Gillick” competent minor, the jurisdiction of the court could still be 
exercised to override such a decision. The “best interests” approach that the 
judiciary have taken to such cases was evident again in Re W, which 
concerned the refusal of treatment by a troubled minor suffering from 
anorexia nervosa. Balcombe LJ said that the question of when the courts 
should override the wishes of a minor refusing medical treatment should be 
looked at on an incremental basis as a matter of fact. He concluded: “What I 
do stress is that the judge should approach the exercise of discretion with a 
65 Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 at 226.  
66 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) (1987) 2 BMLR 126 at 133.  
67 Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 
68Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1991] 3 WLR 592; Re W (A 
Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758. 
69 Ibid at 776 per Balcombe LJ. 
70 Ibid at 781.  
71 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1991] 3 WLR 592 at 601-2. 
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predilection to give effect to the child’s wishes on the basis that prima facie 
that will be in his or her best interests.”72
Such a position illustrates the way that the judiciary is willing to respect 
the decision-making capacity of a minor up to the point where it is felt that the 
minor is in danger of causing harm to themselves. At this point, although the 
wishes of the minor are not totally disregarded, they are overridden as the 
welfare of the child is deemed to be paramount. The practical impact of the 
common law position for conscientious minors who are Jehovah’s Witnesses 
was summarised by Sir Stephen Brown in Re L: 
 
“It is also my view… that it would be the appropriate order to 
make even if I were not justified in coming to the conclusion 
that she was not so called ‘Gillick competent.’ This is an 
extreme case and her position is grave indeed. It is vital that 
she should receive this treatment.”73
 
Although such judgements suggest that an assessment of the minor’s 
capacity is a key consideration in deciding whether the refusal of treatment 
can be binding, satisfying the test of competency will make no difference to 
whether the autonomy of the minor is to be respected. Refusal of treatment 
will be overridden if it is felt that this is in the best interests of the minor when 
objectively considered. Whether the minor sufficiently understands the 
decision they are making ultimately has no practical value whatsoever. 
Such an approach is unsatisfactory because it displays a total 
unwillingness on the part of the courts to treat the competent minor in the 
same way as the competent adult, on the basis that age should be considered 
above all else for decision-making purposes. Lowe and Juss comment that “in 
the final analysis, a child is still only a child.”74  
The possibility that an autonomous minor could make decisions that risk 
their health or, possibly, even their life needs to be placed in a societal 
context. A 16-year-old is legally entitled to drive a moped or a car at 17.75 
Similarly, the law allows a 16-year-old to buy cigarettes or fireworks.76 
Government legislation expressly allows minors to exercise self-
determination even if the consequences of such actions may be serious harm. 
Parents are not afforded a right to veto such activities and the judiciary is 
given no opportunity to objectively consider the child’s best interests. 
72 Ibid  at 776. 
73 Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810 at 813. 
74 Lowe N and Juss S ‘Medical Treatment – Pragmatism and the Search for Principle,’ 
Medical Law Review, (1993) p 865-871. 
75 Motor Vehicle (Driving Licences) Regulations 1999. 
76 Children and Young Persons Act 1933; Explosives Act 1875 s 31.   
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Similarly, children from 14 or even younger can be made criminally culpable 
for their actions, illustrating that their decisions can carry with them legal 
responsibility.77 Against such a background, can it really be justifiable to 
overrule a competent child who wants to exercise autonomy in relation to his 
healthcare?  
 The criticism of adopting such an approach is that minors who are 
Jehovah’s Witnesses who fully understand the implications of vetoing blood 
based medical treatment and the possible consequences of such a refusal, will 
never have such conscientious views respected. Their religious stance will 
always be undermined, due to such a belief system not being the recognised 
norm within society. Can such paternalistic intervention really be argued to 
represent the best interests of the minor? It is suggested that, although no one 
doubts the good intentions of the judiciary in giving primacy to the 
preservation of life in such cases, such an outcome-based approach is ill-
advised when applied to cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
After all, although in the case of Re E the decision of the court to 
prescribe blood- based treatment gave the minor two more years of life, the 
fact that he immediately refused blood when attaining the age of majority 
suggests that the minor still had ultimate regard for his religious beliefs rather 
than his life being preserved at all costs. It is arguable that prolonging his life 
in such circumstances when his views were clear and unambiguous simply 
added to his level of emotional distress and deprived him of his dignity. This 
point has not gone unnoticed within the medical community, with the 
Association of Anaesthetists commenting: 
 
“Administration of blood to a competent patient against their 
will and in conflict with their genuinely held beliefs has been 
likened by the witnesses to rape. It may have as deep a 
psychological effect as forceful sexual interference.”78
 
Against the backdrop of such psychological anguish for the minor, can it 
really be said that the outcome-based approach used to justify judicial 
paternalism is truly in their best interests. E, S and L all made their refusals 
clear either using an ‘Advance Medical Directive’ or by notifying the doctors 
of their stance prior to an emergency situation. Refusal of blood was not 
merely based on a whim or the emotion of the situation, but was due to deeply 
rooted religious objections.  
Surely the lack of respect for a minor’s autonomy in such circumstances is 
likely to be deeply traumatic for the youth and leave them with a profound 
77 Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
78 Management of Anaesthesia for Jehovah’s Witnesses, Association of Anaesthetists 
of Great Britain and Ireland, (March 1999) p 3 pp 2,4. 
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sense that they have been violated. Can it really be in the minor’s best 
interests to pay no respect to their religious views in such an instance? Even 
Johnson J acknowledged in Re P79 that “treatment which is imposed against 
the wishes of the patient is surely to be avoided wherever possible.” This is all 
the more true when dealing with Jehovah’s Witnesses who satisfy the legal 
test of capacity. 
The Gillick decision was thought to herald a new legal dawn granting 
competent minors a right to self-determination with respect to all medical 
decisions. However, subsequent case law has demonstrated that the aim is to 
protect a doctor from possible litigious claims.80 The representation by Lord 
Donaldson of consent either as a “legal flak jacket”81 or as “merely a key 
which unlocks a door”82 can be criticized for not protecting the principle of 
self-determination by focusing too heavily on the avoidance of punishment. 
The British Medical Association has taken a position that clearly supports and 
respects minors who have the capacity to make medical decisions for 
themselves: 
 
“The tendency to regard mature young people as autonomous 
in their own right is a very welcome trend which should not 
be undermined… Respect for autonomy must be 
commensurate with the ability of the individual to decide… 
Minors who are clearly competent to agree to treatment must 
be acknowledged as also having an option to refuse treatment 
if they understand the implications of doing so.”83
 
The medical profession in the UK clearly recognizes that a competent 
minor has the right to self-determination. There can be no justification for the 




79 Re P(A Minor) [2003] EWHC 2327 (Fam) at 10. 
80 Douglas G The Retreat from Gillick, Medical Law Review,(1992) 55 MLR 569. 
81 Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758. at 
767.  
82 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1991] 3 WLR 592 at 599.  
83 Medical Ethics Today: Its Practice and Philosophy, (British Medical Association, 
1993) pp 1:3.2; 3:2.1. 
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When a child is clearly incapable of looking after themselves because of 
tender age Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that the appropriate decision-makers 
should be the child’s parents.84 The family unit has always been regarded 
within society as the appropriate place to protect the interests of the child, a 
point highlighted in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
 
“[the family is] the natural environment for the growth and 
well-being of all its members and particularly children, and 
should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so 
that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the 
community.”85
 
Lord Fraser acknowledged such a principle in Gillick,86 when he 
commented that “Nobody doubts, certainly I do not doubt, that in the 
overwhelming majority of cases the best judges of a child’s welfare are his or 
her parents.”  When exercising such a choice, the fact that a parent takes a 
medical decision on the basis of religiously held views with which the medics 
disagree should not legitimate transferring the power to make that decision 
away from parents to an officer of the State. Such a principle was upheld in 
the United States Supreme Court.87 Julius Landworth, MD, noted:  
 
“Parents have a right to select among medically appropriate 
options based on their individualised assessment of the 
relative burdens and benefits of the proposed intervention 
from the perspective of personal and family values.”88
 
 
84Family Care and Medical Management for Jehovah’s Witnesses, (Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society, Inc. 2002) Family p 3. 
85 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 20th November 1989, Preamble. 
86 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, [1985] 3 All ER 402 at 
412. 
87 Parham v J R  442 US 584, 99 S Ct 2493,2504 (1979). 
88 Landwirth J ‘Ethical Issues in Paediatric and Neonatal Resusitation,’ Annals of 
Emergency Medicine’,Vol 22, No 2 (Part 2), February 1993, pp 236-41 at 238. 
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II. The Question of Medical Necessity 
 
When the doctor considers the minor’s health to be in serious danger 
unless they receive an immediate blood transfusion the situation is not so 
straight forward and whether the situation is one of medical necessity, or not, 
may still be a matter of opinion. The notes editors writing in the Minnesota  
Law Review commented: 
 
“The issue of compulsory treatment should only be reached 
after the diagnosis is sound. In determining whether the 
judgement is sound, the opinion of the doctors seeking 
authorisation should be carefully scrutinized in view of their 
involvement.”89
 
The Honourable Madame Justice Beverley McLachlin of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, called for caution when “weighing whether the facts show a 
likelihood of severe physical or emotional harm to the child unless state 
intervention is permitted.”90 Dr. Richard Spence speaking for physicians 
unwilling to treat Jehovah’s Witnesses in accordance with their wishes has 
said: “If you can’t transfuse, transfer. [This] helps the patient to live and the 
transferring physicians to live with themselves.”91 Once all reasonable steps 
have been taken to explore medical alternatives to blood and the situation is 
truly life-threatening, parents that are Jehovah’s Witnesses will respect the 
decisions of the courts if the judge in question feels compelled by the 
circumstances to issue an order permitting the use of blood. To support and 
assist patients who are Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Hospital Liaison Committee 
Network has been designed to act as a liaison between the doctor and the adult 
patient, or the parents and the minor, at the patient’s request.92 Jehovah’s 
89 Notes editors Edwin C Carpenter, Lawrence A Lokken and Thomas D Tews 
‘Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State’s Interest Re-evaluated’ 51 Minnesota 
Law Review 293 at 304 (1966). 
90 Honourable Madame Justice B McLachlin, ‘Who Owns Our Kids? Education, 
Health and Religion in a Multicultural Society,’ Address to the Canadian Institute for 
Advanced Legal Studies, Cambridge Lectures, July 1991.  
91 Spence R K ‘The Status of Bloodless Surgery,’ Transfusion Medicine Reviews, Vol 
V, No 4, October 1991, pp 274-286 at 285. 
92Such Committees are made up of qualified professionals who are able to help 
hospitals to locate doctors who are willing to treat patients using non-blood medical 
management. In the UK, the Hospital Liaison Committees have a database of around 
5000 doctors who have submitted that they would be willing to be available for 
consultation or a transfer, in order to treat Jehovah’s Witnesses using non-blood 
medical management. I am grateful for an interview with Paul Wade, Head of 
Hospital Information Services (Britain) for Jehovah’s Witnesses, March 2005. 
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Witness families with the help of the Hospital Liaison Committees seek a 
solution that can give the best medical care to their children whilst 
accommodating the sincere religious beliefs of the parents.  
In Re S 93 a 4 ½ year old child suffered from T-cell leukaemia with a high 
risk of death. The parents of S were dedicated Jehovah’s Witnesses who 
conscientiously refused to the intensive chemotherapy that was able to treat 
the disease since it included the transfusion of blood as an integral part of the 
treatment. The local authority sought an order from the court permitting the 
use of blood transfusions. Thorpe J commented that the parenting of S had 
always been above criticism, and that a close accord had been established 
between the hospital and parents on diagnosis.94 The judge also remarked on 
how impressed he was with the emotional control and sincerity with which the 
father of S stated his convictions, concluding that “there was no impression of 
the bigot, of the closed mind, or of unreasonable obstinacy.”95
Thorpe J considered the appropriate legal test to be the “best interests” of 
the child. Under these circumstances, the duty of the court was felt to be to do 
all that could be done to offer S a chance of a medical remedy and provide the 
appropriate consent for such medical treatment endorsing the use of blood.  
The judge also made clear that the judicial act of taking responsibility for 
consent away from the parents of S would allow the parents to absolve their 
conscience of responsibility for the child being treated using blood.96 The 
Family Division was again asked to consider the question of whether the court 
should override beliefs of two of Jehovah’s Witnesses, in order to treat their 
incompetent child using blood in Re O.97 This case concerned a baby that had 
been born 12 weeks prematurely and consequently suffered from respiratory 
distress syndrome. The local authority made an application for an emergency 
protection order that would allow a blood transfusion to be given without the 
consent of the parents in an emergency situation. Furthermore, they applied 
for a care order on the basis that there was a further and continuing need for 
medical treatment involving blood transfusions. Johnson J recognised that the 
dilemma for the parents was “awesome”, due to the fact that they were 
“deeply committed and loving parents” who did not want their child to die.98 
However, the judge also felt that, whilst endeavouring to pay every respect to 
the religious principles underlying the family’s decision, intervention was 
necessary in this instance to protect the welfare of the child, quoting from 
93 Re S (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 11 BMLR 105. 
94 Ibid at 106. 
95 Ibid at 108. 
96 Ibid at 109. 
97 Re O (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149 (Fam). 
98 Ibid at 151. 
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Lord Upjohn that he must act “as the judicial reasonable parent.”99 On this 
basis, he would give directions to administer blood when the medical need 
arose.  
In Re R100 a 10-month-old baby suffering from lymphoblastic leukaemia, 
needed a blood transfusion, R’s parents, as Jehovah’s Witnesses, withheld 
consent.  A specific issue order was applied for. Booth J considered such an 
order, ordering the treatment of the child with blood, to be appropriate on the 
basis that “the welfare of the little girl is the court’s paramount 
consideration.”101 It was agreed amongst all parties that the specific issue 
order, although allowing blood to be administered in an imminently life-
threatening situation without the consent of the parents, should require the 
doctors to consult with the parents in any situation less than imminently life-
threatening. Such consultation would allow all alternative forms of non-blood 
medical management to be considered. If the conclusion of the doctor after 
such consultation was that there was no reasonable alternative to the 
administration of blood, then they could act in this way without the parents 
consent. 
Such cases illustrate the fact that the welfare of the child will always be 
viewed as the key consideration, and this is to be assessed on the basis of what 
the courts consider to be the outcome of parental refusal to treatment. This 
approach is perhaps not surprising in relation to incompetent minors when one 
bears in mind that the judiciary have decided cases involving “Gillick” 
competent minors in the same way. The approach of the courts has given a 
high level of respect to parental autonomy, whilst recognizing that in certain 
circumstances there are criteria that the proxy cannot have regard to when 
coming to a decision for the incompetent patient. These decisions do not 
endorse a blanket-like overruling of parental autonomy when the court does 
not agree with a decision based on religious beliefs. The courts were not 
seeking to disregard the right of the parents to make a choice in all cases. 
Rather, the protective powers of the court would only be exercised in very 
particular circumstances. It was felt that an order to give blood should be 
issued only when there was no reasonable alternative to using blood to treat 
the serious condition of the child.  
The UK courts have not had to provide a judgement on whether they 
would override the wishes of Jehovah’s Witnesses who wished their children 
to be treated using a blood-free form of treatment that had a lower chance of 
success to a blood-based alternative. However, it is likely from the obiter dicta 
of the judges that deference would be given by the courts to parental 
autonomy as long as there was a reasonable alternative to using blood. This 
99 Ibid at 152. 
100 Re R (A Minor) (Blood Transfusion) [1993] 2 FLR 757 (Fam). 
101 Ibid at 759. 
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conclusion can be made on the basis that Booth J. phrased the specific issue 
order in such a way to make sure that other options were considered before 
blood products were administered.102 The order was only to have legal force if 
such an alternative did not exist. Blood transfusions were not to be 
administered simply as a matter of routine when they were not medically 
necessary, a point clarified in Re O. 103 Thorpe J also intimated that the legal 
position may well be different if there was a choice of procedures, one of 
which was medically more risky but not objected to by the parents. He did not 
make a definitive statement on such a point, but the fact that there was only 
one available form of treatment seemed to be the determining factor in 
reaching the conclusion that judicial intervention was justified. Although it 
would be dependant on the facts of the particular case, it is likely that a 
decision by one of Jehovah’s Witnesses to opt for treatment for their child that 
was medically riskier, but blood free, would be within the zone of decision-
making afforded to parents as long as the treatment has not been totally 
rejected by all responsible medical authority. Such a conclusion would echo 
the approach that has been adopted in foreign jurisdictions and is felt to be 
justified because, as noted by Kennedy and Grubb, there is no real basis for 
the court to claim that they are a better parent than those who are prima facie 
entitled to form such a judgement.104
The need for the parents to be heard and remain part of the decision-
making process in cases where doctors seek an order to administer blood, 
guided the reasoning in both Re O and Re S. The basic procedural right of 
giving parents formal notice of such an order and a suitable hearing was 
overlooked in Re O, where an emergency protection order was made without 
necessary notice to the parents. Johnson J commented:  
 
“Whatever the circumstances, efforts should in my view be 
made to achieve an inter partes hearing however unusual the 
particular arrangements may need to be.”105  
 
Booth J concurred with such a view, noting that “the most strenuous 
efforts should always be made to achieve an inter partes hearing. Such issues 
should be determined by a High Court judge.”106 Similarly, in the New 
Zealand case of Re CL the court recognised that there should be a proper 
opportunity for everyone with a legitimate interest to be heard. Justice 
Robertson stated: 
102 Ibid at 760. 
103 Ibid at 761. 
104 Kennedy I and Grubb A, Medical Law, (Butterworths 3rd Edition, 2000) p 795. 
105 Re O (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149 (Fam) at 151. 
106 Re S (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) (1993) 11 BMLR 105. 
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“Whenever there is the potential for an interference with 
parental rights, then to the extent that it is in all the 
circumstances reasonable, the parents’ views should be heard 
and weighed in the decision making process.”107
 
The case law in both the High Court of Australia108 and the Divisional 
Court of Ontario, Canada confirms this as the correct process, with the order 
of a blood transfusion without a fair hearing in Canada deemed to be a “clear 
violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice.”109  
Once legal steps have been taken seeking an order to administer blood, 
reasonable notification should be given to the parents. This will allow the 
court to come to an informed decision about what actions are necessary to 
protect the welfare of the child and demonstrate that parental autonomy will 
not be disregarded without proper consideration. When such actions are 
followed a fair balance is struck between the competing interests of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses faced with an impossible moral dilemma and the judiciary who 
must ensure that the welfare of incompetent patients is not compromised. The 
role of the law in this regard is perhaps best summed up by the words of 
Johnson J. in Re O: 
 
“When the State, in the form here of the legal system, is 
asked to override the views of parents. . . then the system 
should ensure that so far as judicial ingenuity can ensure, 
justice is seen, and felt, to be done.”110
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
 
I. Lessons From Abroad: The American Approach 
 
The approach of the courts in the United States to this issue has 
endeavoured to pay more than mere lip service to the decision-making 
capacity of conscientious minors. The law in the United States includes the 
firmly established doctrine of the “mature minor,” the American equivalent to 
a “Gillick” competent minor. Since the late 1980’s such a doctrine has been 
applied to minors who are Jehovah’s Witnesses. Re E.G111 is a good example, 
107 Re CL [1994] NZFLR 352 at 355 (HC New Zealand). 
108 J v Lieschke (1987) 11 Fam LR. 
109 Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v F(M) (1993), 99 DLR (4th) 378 
at 379 (Ont Div Ct). 
110 Re O (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149 (Fam) at 151. 
111 Re EG 549 NE 2d 322 (Ill 1989). 
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where the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that a 17 year old minor had a 
sufficient level of maturity and understanding to refuse blood based treatment. 
The judgement commented: 
 
“Age is not an impenetrable barrier that magically precludes 
a minor from possessing or exercising certain rights normally 
associated with adulthood.”112   
 
The basic prerequisite in America for the State exercising the inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court, also known as parens patriae authority, on 
behalf of any individual, is that:  
 
“The individual himself must be incapable of making a 
competent decision concerning treatment on his own. 
Otherwise, the very justification for the State’s purported 
exercise of its parens patriae power - its citizen’s inability to 
care for himself - would be missing.”113  
 
The approach in the United States endorses the view that competent 
persons with decision-making capacity, even if they are minors, do not need 
the State to tell them what is the “best” or “right” thing for them, according to 
the value judgement of a doctor or a judge or a social institution. The “best 
interests” approach commonly adopted within the UK has been heavily 
criticized due the lack of real guidance that it gives a judge.  The consequence 
of applying such a vague standard is thought to be that “Judges…may find it 
difficult to avoid decisions resting on subjective values.”114 The US approach 
has consistently opposed the position evident in Re Estates of Brooks:  
 
“What has happened here involves a judicial attempt to 
decide what course of action is best for a particular 
individual, notwithstanding that individual’s contrary views 
based upon religious convictions.”115
 
It is submitted that the American legal model to competence not only 
recognizes that a competent minor should have the right to self-determination 
but also actively seeks to give the law some practical significance for the 
112 Ibid at 327-328. See also, In Re Rena 705 NE 2d 1155 (Mass Ct App 1999); In Re 
Swan, 569 A 2d 1202 (Me 1990). 
113 Rogers v Okin, 634 F 2d 650, 657 (1st Cir 1980). 
114 Smith v Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816, 
835 n 36 (1977). 
115 Re Estates of Brooks, 205 NE 2d 435, 442 (Ill 1965). 
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conscientious Jehovah’s Witness. The outcome based approach within the UK 
that undermines adolescent autonomy when life is at risk in the perceived 
“best interests” of the minor, is no justification for positive state intrusion 
within this model. The state has no lawful interest in protecting competent 
individuals capable of independently protecting their own interests.  
 
II. Lessons From Abroad: The Canadian Approach 
 
The case of Re LDK116 concerned a 12-year-old with life-threatening 
leukaemia who refused blood transfusions as a form of treatment. When such 
treatment was forcibly administered without her consent, this was found to 
violate her rights under the Canadian Charter. An application for further 
blood-based treatment was dismissed by the judge on the basis that this 
offended her religious beliefs and the fact that she had “wisdom and maturity 
well beyond her years.”117 This approach was followed in Re AY118 and 
Walker,119 both cases conferring the right of self-determination on youths who 
refused blood transfusions. They were deemed to be mature young adults 
“capable of understanding the nature and consequences of medical 
treatment.”120
The position in relation to self-determination and competent minors is still 
evolving121 but such cases illustrate that certain judges have found no reason 
to justify paternalism when faced with refusal by mature minors who are 
Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
 
III. An Alternative UK Legal Model 
 
If a minor has the sufficient understanding and maturity to make an 
informed, competent decision, the only difference between the minor and an 
adult in the same situation is that the minor has not yet attained the 
chronological age of majority. A distinction based on nothing more than the 
fortune of majority status should not negate a competent minor’s right to 
determine what happens to his or her body within a principled legal system.  
116 Re LDK; 1st November 1985 48 RFL (2d) 164 (Ontario Provincial Court). 
117 Ibid at 168, 169, 171 per Main Prov J. 
118 Re AY (6th February 1994) 111 Nfld & PEIR 348 APR 91 (Supreme Court of 
Newfoundland) 
119 Walker (Litigation Guardian of) v Region 2 Hospital Corp. (June 23rd 1994) 4 RFL 
(4th) 321 (New Brunswick Court of Appeal). 
120 Ibid at 29,30. 
121 Compare BH (Next Friend of) v Alberta, (Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta), 
2002 ABQB 371. 
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A more appropriate model could be for the medical profession to start out 
from the position   that all patients are presumed to be competent, irrespective 
of age, but that presumption can be rebutted if the patient is unable to satisfy a 
codified test of competency based on the three stages outlined in Re C. This 
test has been carried over into the proposals in the Draft Mental Incapacity 
Bill (2003), with the added provision that a patient should be “able to 
communicate the decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any 
other means).”122  
By treating all patients in this way, it would create a legal standard of 
competency that was impartial and was based on the patient’s decision-
making capacity as opposed to any arbitrary age limit imposed by the State. 
Such a model would bring to an end the unsatisfactory situation in the UK 
where a minor may have to establish a significantly higher level of 
understanding regarding the consequences of a particular decision than an 
adult patient with the same medical predicament.  
 
Some critics have suggested that a determination of every patient’s 
individual ability for competence would be time consuming and impractical, 
Elliston notes that such an objection is not sustainable. He commented that:  
 
“While setting an arbitrary age for such reasons as ability to 
vote is acceptable, since the administrative difficulties 
involved in questioning every citizen in order to establish 
their competence for enfranchisement would be practically 
insurmountable, the same is not true where decisions about 
the management of the health of an individual are concerned. 
Here the individual’s ability to make a decision can be 
scrutinized…”123
  
Such a model would reflect the UK law’s current attitude evident in NHS 
Trust Airedale v Bland that “the principle of sanctity of human life must yield 
to the principle of self-determination.”124 The difference would be that this 
legal position would apply to all competent patients, not just those over 18.  
As such, it is likely that under this new approach, the conscientious refusal 
of blood by E, S and L would have been respected if regarded as the decision 
of a competent patient. 
122 Clause 2 (1)(d). 
123 Elliston  S ‘If You Know What’s Good For You…’: A Consideration of Refusal of 
Consent to Medical Treatment by Children, Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine 
and Ethics, (Dartmouth Publishing Co, 1996) p 29-55. 
124 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER at 866 per Lord Goff of Chieveley. 
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It is important to note that all decisions relating to medical care would 
have to be scrutinised to make sure that the patient was free from any undue 
influence and not compromised by pressure from family or friends. The 
common law already establishes that where a competent patient’s decision is 
based on the undue influence of a third party, however well intentioned, such 
a decision will not be based on the independent understanding of that person 
and will be disregarded.125  
Critics may suggest that such an approach effectively signs a death 
warrant for unstable minors like those in the cases of Re R and Re W. 
However, when analysing the position of such minors, it is important to 
recognise what the legal position would have been for these ones had they 
been judged against the Re C criteria. There is the definite possibility that R 
would have been held not to satisfy the second requirement of the test in Re C, 
that she believed the treatment information given to her. R was diagnosed 
with a psychotic disorder but nevertheless sought to refuse the anti-psychotic 
medication prescribed as necessary to help such a condition. A veto of 
medication in the light of such circumstances makes it highly debatable 
whether R truly believed that she actually had a mental condition that required 
treatment. 
Similarly, in Re W, although W was not directly suffering from a mental 
illness, medical evidence makes it clear that one of the characteristics of 
anorexia nervosa is that it is capable of destroying the sufferer’s ability to 
make an informed choice.  Also, Lord Donaldson noted that one of its clinical 
manifestations was “a firm wish not to be cured, or at least not to be cured 
until the sufferer wishes to kill herself.”126 Against such a background, it is 
easy to conclude that W’s ability to satisfy the third limb of Re C, weighing 
the information in the balance so as to arrive at a clear choice, could be 
compromised. Although neither case demonstrates a complete misperception 
of reality which would automatically rebut the presumption of competence in 
an adult, it is suggested that the underlying mental instability of both W and R 
could result in them not being able to demonstrate that they had arrived at a 
clear choice, being denied competency on these grounds even if they were 
adults. 
With respect to the patient who is unconscious but has made their wishes 
clear through the use of an anticipatory form of refusal such an ‘Advance 
Medical Directive,’ the law should respect the wishes of the patient when it 
can be established that the patient was competent at the time that such wishes 
were made, and all the other criteria to make such a directive valid are 
present.  The problem that arises is where the unconscious patient has no 
125 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649. 
126 Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758 at 
761E. 
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opportunity to satisfy the Re C test, and the evidence is ambiguous as to 
whether an advance directive reflects the independent wishes of a competent 
person who understands the significance of the form. For example, a scenario 
could arise where a 14-year-old unconscious Jehovah’s Witness was admitted 
to hospital in a serious condition. Although she had an advanced “no blood” 
directive signed and up to date, how could the doctor be sure that such a 
stance represented the view of a competent patient free from undue influence? 
In such a situation, as the decision-making capacity of the patient is in doubt, 
it is suggested that the most appropriate response would be for the medical 
practitioner to initially try and do all that they can to preserve life, until it can 
be ascertained what the minor’s true wishes are. The patient should surely be 
the one that bears the responsibility of making their wishes clear to the 
medical profession if they have special circumstances like religious beliefs 
that they want to impact on their healthcare. One practical suggestion for 
dealing with this type of situation would be for a patient that wished to make 
use of an anticipatory form of refusal to have such a directive placed on the 
medical record that they have with their General Practitioner. Such a person 
would be in a position to assess whether their patient satisfied the three stage 
test in Re C and such a refusal was the product of independent thought. If the 
patient had performed such steps and they were deemed competent, in the 
case of an emergency situation where they were unconscious, such actions 
should be given sufficient recognition to entitle the patient’s anticipatory 
refusal to be respected. 
Many today may consider that a loving God would not object to a 
worshipper undertaking a form of healthcare involving blood products if it 
was likely to have a positive effect, possibly even a lifesaving effect, on his or 
another’s physical health. However, far from martyring themselves, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses are exercising their right to determine how they are medically 
treated, choosing to act in a way that will not contravene what they regard as 
perpetual commands and expressing their right to hold and manifest their 
religious belief through the refusal of blood products. Article 9(1) of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 (as set out in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998). 
Article 9 asserts: 
 
 “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. 
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
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necessary in a democratic society . . . for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”  
 
